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[L. A. No. 23176.

In Bank. Apr. 5, 1955.]

FELIX MALLON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF
LONG BEACH (a Corporation) et al., Respondents;
ALMA SWART, Intervener and Appellant.

~'.
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[1] Waters-Tidelands-Limitations on Alienation.-The trust in
which tide and submerged lands are held does not prevent
state from reclaiming such lands from sea where it can be done
without prejudice to public right of navigation and applying
them to other purposes and uses.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.Where tide and submerged lands have been granted in trust
to city of Long Beach by state, partial revocation of trust as
to income derived from extraction of minerals inbedded in
lands subject to trust will not impair public interest in commerce, navigation and fisheries in Long Beach harbor, and
thus such revocation does not conflict with manifest purposes
of Const., art. XV, §§ 2, 3, relating to tidelands fronting on
waters of harbor.
[3] Id.-Tidelands-Conclusiveness of Legislative Determination.
-Where Legislature has "found and determined" that, to extent of partial revocation of trust as to income derived from
extraction of minerals imbedded in tide and submerged lands
granted to city of Long Beach by state subject to trust, ineome derived from production of oil and gas from such lands
"is no longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries,
Dor for such uses, trusts, conditions as are imposed by" statutes
granting such lands in trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445), such determination is conclusive on reviewing court in absence of evidence indicating that abandonment of public trust will impair
power of succeeding legislatures to protect, improve and develop public interest in commerce, navigation and fisheries.
[4] Id.-Tidelands-Conclusiveness of Legislative Determination.
-In action to enjoin city of Long Beach and its officers from
appropriating and expending for general municipal purposes
income derived from sale of gas produced from tide and
submerged lands of Long Beach harbor which Legislature has

[1] See Cal.Jur., Waters, § 541 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 293 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Corporations, § 491.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 452; [2,5,7,10,11,14,15]
Municipal Corporations, § 382; [3, 4] Municipal Corporatinns,
§386j [6] Trusts, §170j [8] Municipal Corporations, §81; [9]
Municipal Corporations, § 86; [12] State of California, § 33; [13]
State of Califoma, § 34.
~{unicipal
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determined is no longer required for navigation, COUlmerce
and fisheries, nor for such uses as are imposed by statutes
granting sucb lands to city in trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445), contention that succeeding generations might have need for monies
thus freed from trust for development and improvement of
state's harbors, waterways and fisheries is matter of speculation and insufficient in itself to overcome legislative determination; and since revocation of trust to that extent does not
contemplate or authorize alienation of tide and submerged
lands free from trust, succeeding legislatures can, if they deem
it necessary for purposes of trust, reestablish public trust on
all income derived from production of oil and gas from such
lands.
[6] Id.-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.-Rule governing private trusts that, in absence of express provision to contrary,
revocation of trust results in reversion of trust property to
settlor (Civ. Code, § 2280) is applicable to trust on which tide
and submerged lands were conveyed to city of Long Beach.
[6] Trusts-Interest and Estate of Trustee.-Trustees normally
hold title to corpus of trust in fee simple, but only for purpose
of carrying out objects of trust; when trust is terminated,
corpus does not become individual property of trustee, but
reverts to settlor.
[7] Municipal Corporations-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.State acting through Legislature has power to alter contractual or property rights acquired by municipal corporation
from state for governmental purposes, even if conveyance of
tide and submerged lands to city of Long Beach by state subject to trust be considered as contract between city and state
or as creating property interests in city.
[8] ld.-Legislative Control.-A municipal corporation has no
privileges or immunities under federal Constitution that it can
invoke against will of state, and under Cal. Const., art. XI,
§ 6, a freeholder city, such as city of Long Beach, is exempt
from legislative control only as to "municipal affairs."
[9] Id.-Legislative Control-Municipal Affairs.-Any interest of
city of Long Beach in tidelands granted to it by state was acquired not as "municipal affair," but subject to public trust
to deVelop its harbor and navigation facilities for benefit of
entire state, and is therefore subject to legislative control.
[lOa, lOb] Id.-Tidelands-Grant to City by State.-U statutory
revocation of trust as to income derived from production of oil
and gas from tide and suhmerged lands granted to city of Long
Beach by state subject to trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445) were to
operate as transfer of monies affected thereby to such city,
such tranf;fer would be gift of public monies in violation of

[6] See Oal.Jur., TrU:its, § 165; Am.Jur.. Trusts,

~

34 et
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Const., art. IV, § 31, there being no benefit to all people of
state from such transfer.
[11] ld.-Tidelands-Grant to Oity by State.-Grants in trust of
tide and submerged lands to municipal corporations have been
made in furtherance of interest of entire state in development
of its harbors, and such grants do not violate constitutional
prohibition against gifts. (Const., art. IV, § 31.)
[12] State of Oalifornia-Gift of Public Funds.-Const., art. IV,
§ 31, specifically forbids making of gift of public monies or
thing of value to any municipal corporation, and fact that
funds transferred to city would be expended for public purposes authorized by city charter is immaterial, since all lawful
4>%penditures of cities are necessarily for public purposes.
[13] ld.-Gift of Public Funds.-Construction and establishment
by city of storm drains, city incinerator, public library, public
hospitals, public parks, fire alarm system, off-street parking
facilities, city streets and highways, and other expenditures
that have been authorized by city charter to be made from
public improvement fund are not of such general statewide interest that state funds can properly be expended thereon; such
expenditures are for purely "municipal affairs" within meaning
of Const., art. XI, § 6, and are normal expenditures for municipal corporation to make, and a grant of public monies from
state to defray such expenditures violates Const., art. IV, § 31,
forbidding making of gifts of public monies to municipal corporations.
[14] Municipal Oorporations-Tidelands-Grant to Oity by State.
-Partial revocation of trust effected by statute as to income
derived from production of oil and gas from tide and submerged lands granted to city of Long Beach by state subject
to trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445) necessarily results in reversion
to state of monies thus released from trust, and city holds such
funds on resulting trust for state.
[16] Id.-Tidelands-Grant to Oity by State.-Statutory provision
that income "heretofore derived or to be derived" by city of
Long Beach from production of "dry gas" from tide and submerged lands granted to city by state subject to trust is free
from public trust (Stats. 1951, p. 2445) does not validate unlawful expenditure of such income for general municipal purposes, and city holds such funds subject to resulting trust in
favor of state.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Paul Nourse, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enjoin a city and its officers from appropriating
and expending income derived from sale of oil and gas produced from tide and submerged lands granted in trust to

)

)
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city by state. Judgment for defendants after demurrers to
complaint were sustained without leave to amend, reversed.
Stratton & Taylor, Chas. C. Stratton and Mark L. Taylor
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Theodore R. Gabrielson and Kenneth E. Matot for Intervener and Appellant.
Preston, Braucht & George, Crowe, Mitchell & Hurlbutt,
Neil Cunningham and J. Thomas Crowe as Amici Curiae OD
behalf of Intervener and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, E. G. Benard, Assistant Attorney General, Leonard M. Friedman and George G.
Grover, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Appellants.
Walhfred Jacobson, City Attorney, Joseph B. Lamb, Assistant City Attorney, Atlee S. Arnold, Deputy City Attorney,
O'Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers, Pierce Works and
William W. Alsup for Respondents.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke
Jones and Arthur W. Nordstrom, Assistant City Attorneys, as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff and plaintiff in intervention appeal from a judgment for defendants entered after defendants'
demurrers to their complaints were sustained without leave
to amend. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from appropriating and expending for general municipal purposes the
income derived from the sale of oil and gas produced from
the tide and submerged lands granted in trust to the city of
Long Beach by the State of California. (Stat8. 1911, p. 1304,
as amended by ~tats. 1925, p. 235, Stats. 1935, p. 793, and
8tats. 1951, p. 2443.) The expenditures to which plaintiffs
object are purportedly authorized by a duly enacted amendment to tb~ charter of the city of Long Beach, the material
parts of which provide:
"The' Public Improvement Fund' is hereby created and
established. . . . Money placed therein shall be used exclusively for the payment of costs and expenses for the acquisi.
tion, construction, reconstruction, development, operation, repair and maintenance of public improvements and the acquisi-

)
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tion of such lands, rights and property as may be necessary
or convenient therefor. . . .
"\Vithin thirty days after the effective date of this section,
the City Treasurer shall transfer to the 'Public Improvement
Fund' fifty per cent of all revenue derived by the City from
oil, gas and other hydrocarbons, and fifty per cent of the
interest, earnings, income and/or profits from investment of
said revenue which is in the 'Harbor Revenue Fund' on the
date of such transfer. \Vithin said thirty days, he shall also
. transfer to the 'Public Improvement Fund' fifty per cent
of all revenue in the' Harbor Reserve Fund' and the' Tideland
Oil Fund' on the date of such transfer.
"At least once each calendar month thereafter, the City
Treasurer shall transfer to the 'Public Improvement Fund'
fifty per cent of all revenue derived by the City from oil,
gas and other hydrocarbons and placed in the' Harbor Revenue
Fund,' which is not required by this Charter to be transferred
from said 'Harbor Revenue Fund' to the 'Harbor Reserve
Fund. ' He shall also transfer to the 'Public Improvement
Fund,' at least once each calendar month thereafter, fifty
per cent of all revenue so derived, which is required by this
Charter to be transferred to the 'Harbor Reserve Fund' and
fifty per cent of all revenue, so derived, which is required
by this chapter to be placed in the 'Tideland Oil Fund.'"
(Charter of the city of Long Beach § 260.8, approved by concurrent resolution of the Legislature [Const., art. XI, § &],
Stats. 1953, p. 3826.)
.
The Harbor Revenue Fund (Stats. 1931, p. 2807), the
Harbor Reserve Fund (Stats. 1949, p. 2857), and the Tideland Oil Fund (Stats. 2d Ex. Sess. 1946, p. 367; Stats. 1949,
p. 2857) arp. depositories of the income derived from the
production of oil and gas from the tide and submerged lands
granted to the city by the state, except for the income derived
from the production of "dry gas" from those lands, which
is handled separately and is discussed below. Plaintiffs claim
that th\:> transfers authorized by this charter amendment and
the expenditures pursuant thereto are unla",ful. Defendants
contend that the type of expenditures enumerated in the
amendment are proper ones for a municipality to make, and
that the transfers ordered by the amendment are authorized
by chapter 915 of the Statutes of 1951. That statute provides:
"Section 1. It is hereby found and determined: That
the City of Long Beach since 1939 has produced and is
DOW producing large quantities of oil, gas and other hydro-
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carbon substances from lands conveyed to said city by [the
statutes cited above]. That from the revenue derived therefrom. said city has constructed upon said lands, wharves,
docks, piers, slips, quays, and other utilities, structures and
appliances necessary or convenient for the promotion and
accommodation of commerce and navigation, at a cost of
approximately thirty-five million dollars ($35,000,000). That
said city has available and unexpended approximately seventy-five million dollars ($75,000,000), also derived from said
source, for the uses and purposes required by said acts. and
is now receiving and will continue to receive for many years
approximately twenty-four million dollars ($24,000,000) per
annum from said source. That, in addition thereto, said city
obtains large quantities of 'dry gas' derived from natural
gas produced from said lands, which is sold by said city to
domestic and other consumers. That by reason of the already
large expenditure on such lands for the uses and purposes
required by said acts, the large additional sums available and
to become available throughout the years for such purposes,
the expenditure of more than a total of fifty per centum
(50%) of such revenue, received and unexpended and hereafter to become available for such uses and purposes, would
be economically impracticable, unwise and unnecessary. That
fifty per centum (50%) of all revenue heretofore derived
and unexpended, and to be derived, by the City of Long Beach
from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances, other than
'dry gas,' produced from lands conveyed by said acts, is no
longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries, nor
for such uses, trusts, conditions and restrictions as are
imposed by said acts. That none of the revenue heretofore
derived, and to be derived, by said city from' dry gas' obtained
from said lands is any longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries, nor for such uses, trusts, conditions and
restrictions as are imposed by said acts.
"For the purposes of this act, 'dry gas' is defined to mean
the gas directly produced from wells, which contains one-half
of a gallon or less of recoverable gasoline per 1,000 cubic feet,
or from which gasoline has been removed by processing.
"Sec. 2. 'rhat fifty per centum (50%) of all revenue
heretofore derived and unexpended, and to be derived, by
the City of Long Beach from oil, gas and other hydrocarbon
-----substarrces-;-ottrer -than-' dry -gas~produeed-from lands-conveyed by said abovc-ciltitlctl acts is hereby declared to be
free from the public trust for navigation, commerce and
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fisheries, and from such uses, trusts, conditions and restrictions as are imposed by any of said above-entitled acts. That
all of the revenue heretofore derived, and to be derived, by
said city from 'dry gas,' obtained from said lands is hereby
declared to be free from the public trust for navigation,
commerce and fisheries, and from such uses, trusts, conditions
and restrictions as are imposed by any of said above-entitled
acts. " (Stats. 1951, pp. 2444-2445.)
The tide and submerged lands from which the monies in
question are derived were originally owned b~ the State
subject to a trust for purposes of commerce, navigation, and
fisheries for the benefit of all the people of the state. (City
of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal.2d 254, 262 [188 P.2d 17];
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 614 [82 P.2d
362] ; Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 183, 189 [273 P. 797] ;
City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 175 Cal. 575, 579 [166 P.
333] ; People v. Califorma Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584 /138
P. 79], quoting from Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387,452-453 [13 8.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018].) The Legislature committed the administration of this trust to the city
of Long Beach (City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, supra, 175
Cal. 575, 579; and see Pub. Resources Code, § 6875) by conveying the lands involved to the city in fee simple (City of
Long Beach v. Marshall, s'upra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 613) subject
to an express trust that they be devoted exclusively to the
improvement of commerce, navigation, and fisheries for the
benefit of all the people of the state. (Ibid.; Atwood v.
Hammond, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 37-38 [48 P.2d 20], and cases cited.)
The lands granted included the minerals therein, which
are also subject to the trust. (City of Long Beach v. Morse,
lupra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 257-258; City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 614; Trickey v. City of Long
Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871, 879 [226 P.2d 694].) Before
the enactment of the 1951 statute, quoted above, we held
that "the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas from th~
lands in question may not be used for any purposes other
than those specified in the trust conveyances under which
the [city of Long Beach] claims title to the lands. The
Legislature specified purposes relating to the harbor that it
deemed beneficial to the state as a whole and did not authorize
the city of Long Beach to use the corpus or the income of
the trust for strictly local improvements." (City of Long
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Cal.2c1 254, 262; see also Trickey
v. Cit" of Long Beach, supra, 101 Cal.App.2d 871, 880.)

)
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The transfers and expenditures authorized by the 1953 amendment to the charter of the city of Long Beach are of the
same character as those declared unlawful in the Morse case.
(See Stats. 2d Ex. Sess. 1946, pp. 366, 367.) The lawfulness
of those transfers and expenditures depends, therefore, on
the validity and effect of the 1951 statute revoking in part
the public trust on the income derived from the lands in
question. Thus, the principal issues to be resolved in the
present case are whether the revocation was a valid exercise
of the legislative power, whether the revocation operated as
a transfer from the state to the city of the monies affected
thereby, and, if so, whether such a transfer would offend the
constitutional prohibition against gifts of public monies.
[1] It is well established that "[ t ] he trust in which tide
and submerged lands are held does not prevent the state from
reclaiming tide and submerged lands from the sea where it
can be done without prejudice to the public right of navigation and applying them to other purposes and uses." (Boone
v. Kingsbury, s"upra, 206 Cal. 148, 189; Illinois Oentral R. 00.
v. Illinois, supra, 146 U.S. 387,452-453; Atwood v. Hammond,
supra, 4 Cal.2d 31, 41; Oakland v. Oakland Waterfront 00.,
118 Cal. 160, 183-185 [50 P. 277] ; People v. Oalifornia Fish
00., supra, 166 Cal. 576, 585-586; Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal.
365, 372·373.) This principle has never been judicially
applied in this state to the partial revocation of the public
trust as to the income derived from the extraction of minerals
imbedded in the lands subject to the trust, but the Legislature
has devoted such income from tide and submerged lands held
by the state to uses unconnected with the purposes of the
public trust. (See Stats. 1921, chap. 303, § 19; Pub. Resources
Code, § 6816.) Furthermore, we can see no real distinction
between reclamation of peripheral lands that become, in the
course of harbor development, unusable for purposes of the
trust (Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 40-41) and
the reclamation of part of the minerals imbedded in the lands
subject to the trust that likewise become unnecessary for
the purposes of the trust. [2] Such a partial revocation
of the trust will in no way impair the public interest in
commerce, navigation, and fisheries in Long Beach harbor,
and thus the revocation does not conflict with the manifest
purposes of sections 2 and 3 of article XV of the Constitution.
(See People v. Oaliforonia Fish 00., supra, 166 Cal. 576, 598;
Oimpher v. Oity of DaTeland, 162 Cal. 87, 90 [121 P. 374].)
[3J Moreover, the Legislature has "found and determined"
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that, to the extent affected by such partial revocation, the
income derived from the production of oil and gas from the
tide and submerged lands of Long Beach harbor ' 'is no
longer required for navigation, commerce and fisheries. nor
for such uses, trusts, conditions and restrictions as are imposed by" the statutes granting the said tide and submerged
lands in trust. (Stats. 1951, p. 2445.) That determination
and finding is conclusive upon this court in the absence of
evidence indicating that the abandonment of the public trust
will impair the power of succeeding legislatures to protect,
improve, and develop the public interest in commerce, navigation, and fisheries. (Oounty of San Diego v. Hammond,
6 Cal.2d 709, 726 [59 P.2d 478, 105 A.L.R. 1155] ; Boone v.
Kingsbury, supra, 206 Cal. 148, 183; People v. Oalifornia
Fish 00., supra, 166 Cal. 576, 597; Oakland v. Oakland Waterfront 00., supra, 118 Cal. 160, 185.) [4] Plaintiffs' sole
contention on this point, that succeeding generations might
have need for the monies thus freed from the trust for development and improvement of the state's harbors, waterways,
and fisheries, is a matter of speculation and is insufficient of
itself to overcome the legislative determination. Moreover, since the revocation in question does not contemplate
or authorize the alienation of the tide and submerged lands
free from the trust, succeeding legislatures can, if they deem
it necessary for the purposes of the trust, reestablish the
public trust on all the income derived from the production
of oil and gas from the lands in question.
The next question is whether the revocation effected by
the 1951 statute operates to transfer the monies involved to
the state, as the plaintiff in intervention contends, or whether
it operates as a transfer of those monies to the city of Long
Beach, as defendants contend. In an early case concerning
title to former pueblo lands, which the state held subject
to a public trust for it municipal purposes," this court said
that" [t]hrough such repeal [of the act by which the administration of the trust was transferred to the city of Monterey]
the entire property held for public use-which would include
the public lands-would revert to the state, and no limitation
being imposed upon the legislature under the constitution
of 1849· in that respect, could be then disposed of in any
manner it saw fit." (Oity of Monterey v. Jacks, 139 Cal.
·The prohibition on "the making of any gift, of any public money

or thing of value" (Const., art. IV, § 31) was not added to the Constiiution until 187~.

i

I
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542, 555-556 [73 P. 4361, affirmed in 203 U.S. 360 [27 S.Ct.
67, 51 L.Ed. 220]; see also San Francisco v. Oanavan, 42
Cal. 541, 554-556; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 624.) In
an early Kentucky case, concerning a grant of public lands
for school purposes, similar reasoning was employed: "thEl
legislature granted this land to the persons named in the
trust for a certain purpose, and the title of the commonwealth
did not pass from it to the grantees, except for that purpose;
and, when the object of the trust became extinct, the title
reverted to the commonwealth as a matter of law . . . . The
reversion of title in such a case is . . . in consequence of
the failure of the purpose for which it was granted." (Kennedy v. McElroy, 92 Ky. 72 [17 S.W. 202, 22 S.W. 442, 443].)
[5] The reasoning in these cases is the same as that governing private trusts in which, in the absence of an express
provision to the contrary, a revocation of the trust results
in a reversion of the trust property to the settlor. (Civ.
Code, § 2280; see 3 Scott on Trusts (1939), § 345.3.) That
this reasoning applies to the trust on which the tide and
submerged lands in question were conveyed to the city of
Long Beach is indicated by the language in Oity of Long
Beach v. Morse, sltpra, 31 Cal.2d 254, 257, that the "city is
a trustee and as such 'assumes the same burdens and is
subject to the same regulations that appertain to other trustees
of such trusts.' [Citation.] " Defendants' reliance on the
statement in Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609
[82 P.2d 362], that the lands were granted to the city in
fee simple, is therefore ill founded. It was clearly recognized
in that case that the city's title in fee simple was subject
to the public trust (11 Ca1.2d at 613; and see Oity of Long
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 259), and the problem
of the clTect of a rf'vocation of the trust was not then before
the court. [6] Moreover, trustees normally hold title to
the corpus of the trust in fee simple, but only for the purpose
of carrying ont the objects of the trust. (See Oity of Long
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 258.) \Vhen the trust
is terminated, the corpus does not become the individual
prolwrty of the trustee; it reverts to the settlor.
Defendants also contend that the dictum in Atwood v.
Hammond,4 Ca1.2d 31, 44 [48 P.2d 20], that "the state could
not by unilateral action divest the city of its title, nor annex
a different use to this eighteen acre parcel [of reclaimed
tidelands]," established the rule thRt although the state can
terminate the public trust over such lands, the termination
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of the trust results, not in a reversion to the state as grantor,
but in the ownership by the city of an absolute title to the
lands originally conveyed to it in trust. This contention
is based on the assumption that, pursuant to a conveyance
to it from the state of lands subject to a public trust, ~he
city acquires property or contractual rights that are beyond
the power of the Legislature to alter. [7] Even if a conveyance, such as the one to the city of Long Beach in the
present case, from the state to a municipal corporation is
considered as a contract between the city and the Gtate or
as creating property interests in the city, the state act,;ng
through the Legislature has the power to alter contractual or
property rights acquired by the municipal corporation from
the state for governmental purposes. (Oounty of Alameda v.
Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 284 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141] ;
Rat'lroad Oom. v. Los Angeles R. Oorp., 280 U.S. 145, 156
[50 8. Ct. 71, 74 L.Ed. 234]; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262
U.S. 182, 188, 191-192 [43 8.Ct. 534, 67 L.Ed. 937, 29 A.L.R.
1471] ; Pawhuska v. Pawhuska O·il &- Gas 00., 250 U.S. 394,
398-399 [39 8. Ct. 526, 63 L.Ed. 1054] ; Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161, 178-179 [28 8.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151] and cases
cited: New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works 00., 142
U.S. 79, 91 [12 8.Ct. 142, 35 L.Ed. 943]; see also Brooklyn
& R-ichmond Ferry 00. V. United States, 167 F.2d 330, 333;
Schulz, "The Effect of the Oontract Olause and the Fourteenth Amendment Upon the Power of the States to Oontrol
Municipal Oorporations," 36 Mich.L.Rev. 385, 387-398, 408.)
[8] A municipal corporation has no privileges or immunities under the United States Constitution that it can invoke
against the will of the state (Williams V. Mayor & Oity Oounc·il of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 [53 S.Ct. 431, 77 L.Ed.
1015]), and under the California Constitution a freeholder
city, such as the city of Long Beach, is exempt from legislative control only as to "municipal affairs." (Const., art.
XI, § 6; Eastlick v. Oity of Los Angeles, 29 Ca1.2d 661, 665
[177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225] and cases cited.) [9] It is
clear in the present case that any interest of the city of Long
Beach in the tidelands was acquired not as a "municipal
affair," but subject to a public trust to develop its harbor
and navigation facilities for the benefit of the entire state,
and was therefore subject to the control of the Legislature.
(Oity of Monterey v. Jacks, supra, 139 Cal. 542, 555-556.)
Moreover, the construction of the 1951 statute for which
defendanti contend would result in its unconstitutionality.

)
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[lOa] If the statutory revocation operates as a transfer of

)

the monies affected thereby to the city of Long Beach, such
a transfer would be a gift of public monies in violation of
section 31 of article IV of the Constitution.· Defendants
argue that the development of the harbor without expense
to the state was sufficient consideration for the original grant
of the lands in trust, and that, the grant having thus been
made, the state had nothing more of value to convey and
the 1951 statue merely r<>leascd certain conditions and restrictions on the original grant. [11] Although the question
of gift has never been directly discussed in any of the cases,
it is clear that grants in trust of tide and submerged lands
to municipal corpcJrations have been made in furtherance
of the interest of the entire state in the development of its
harbors and thus such grants do not violate the constitutional
prohibition against gifts. (See City of Long Beach v. Morse,
supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 262; Miller v. Stockburger, 12 Ca1.2d
440,444 [85 P.2d 132] ; Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d
31, 45; Oakland v. Oakland lV at el'front Co., supra, 118 Cal.
160, 189; City of N ewporf Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal.App.2d
23, 29 [102 P.2d 4381.) Defendants contend, however, that
the transfer to the city of the monies released from the trust
by the 1951 statute would not violate the constitutional prohibition against gifts bet'ausc the state had nothing of value
to convey and the city received nothing of value by reason of
that statute. There is no merit in this contention. [lOb] Ift
as defendants contend, the city is entitled to those monies,
it is entitled to them by reason of the statute. If defendants'
interpretation of the statute is the correct one, the city now
has available for general municipal expenditures millions of
dollars that were not available to it before the enactment
of the 1951 statute. (City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra,
31 Ca1.2d 254, 262.) There being no benefit to all the people
of the state from such a transfer, it would be a gift of public
monies and thus prohibited by the Constitution.
County of Los Llngcles v. SOllihcrn Calif. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.
2d 378 [196 P.2d 773], on which defendants rely, is not
ilH!Onsistent with this conclusion. That case involved tp,e
validity of franchises acquired under the provisions of section
53G of the Civil Code. In hol(ling that such franchises are
not gifts within the lllC':llIillg" of section 31 of article IV, we
*' I Sec. 31. 'l'l!e Legislature shall have no power .•• to make any gift
or authorize thE' mal,ing of any gift, of any public money or thing of
value to any individua.l, IDWlicipal or other corporation whatever•• •• "
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said that "the state is assured of a continuing benefit in
return for the privileges granted under section 536. . . .
The company must not only construct a telephone system
but it must render service, and if it fails to do so the franchise
terminates. Thus the state receives a benefit during the life
of the franehise, since in order to retain it the company must
continue to serve the public . . .
"Since the offer of a franchise in section 536, when accepted,
results in a binding agreement supported by a valid consideration, there is no gift within the meaning of the constitutional prohibitions." (32 Ca1.2d at 388.)
[12] It is suggested, however, that the expenditures purportedly authorized by section 260.8 of the charter of the
city of Long Beach are expenditures for public purposes
and thus that a transfer of the funds in question from the
state to the city would not be a gift within the meaning
of section 31 of article IV of the Constitution. There is no
merit to this contention. That section of the Constitution
specifically forbids the making of a gift of public monies or
thing of value to any municipal corporation, and all lawful
expenditures of such corporations are necessarily for public
purposes. Moreover, as we said in Oity of Oakland v.
Garrison, 194 Cal. 298, 304 [228 P. 433], in reference to
the appropriation of county funds for the improvement of
a city street, "It is not sufficient, therefore, that the appropriation here in question be for a public purpose. It must
also be for a purpose which is of interest and benefit generally
to the people of the county of Alameda. The question, then,
is whether the improvement of this particular street within
the city of Oakland is a matter of such general county interest
that the county funds may properly be expended therein."
[13] Applying that principle to the present case, we cannot
hold that the construction and establishment by the city
of Long Beach of storm drains, a city incinerator, a public
library, public hospitals, public parks, a fire alarm system,
off-street parking facilities, city streets and highways, and
other expenditures that have been authorized to be made
from the "Public Improvement Fund," are of such general
state-wide interest that state funds could properly be expended
thereon. Such expenditures are for pureJy "municipaJ affairs" within the meaning of section 6 of article XI of the
Constitution. (See Oity of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34
Ca1.2d 595, 599 [2]2 P.2d 894] [sewer]; Jardine v. Oity of
Pasadena, 199 Cal 64, 68 [248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. 509] [isola-
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tion hospital] ; Stege v. City of Rickrnond, 194 Cal. 305, 312
[228 P. 461J [city streets] ; City of Pasadena v. Paine, 126
Cal.App.2d 93, 98 [271 P.2d 577J [city library] ; Alexander
v. Mitckell, 119 Cal.App.2d 816, 826-827 [260 P.2d 261]
[off·street parking facilities]; Perez v. City of San Jose,
107 Cal.App.2d 562, 566 [237 P.2d 548] [city highways];
Beard v. City & County of San Francisco, 79 Cal.App.2d
753, 755 [180 P.2d 744] [public hospital] ; Arrnas v. City of
Oakland, 135 Cal.App. 411, 420 [27 P.2d 666, 28 P.2d 422]
[fire protection 1.) Moreover, they are normal expenditures for
a municipal corporation to make, and to hold that a
grant of public monies from the state to defray such expenditures is not a gift within the meaning of section 31
of article IV of the Constitution would render meaningless
the express prohibition therein against gifts to "municipal
corporations." [14] We conclude, therefore, that in view
of the intendments in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute (Jersey Maid Jltlilk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Ca1.2d
620, 636 [91 P.2d 577]. and cases cited), we must adopt
the construction of the 1951 statute indicated by City of
Monterey v. Jacks, supra, 139 Cal. 542, 555-556, and we hold
that the partial revocation of the trust effected by that statute
necessarily results in a reversion to the state of the monies
thus released from the trust, and the city holds those funds
upon a resulting trust for the state. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' other constitutional objections
to the construction of the statute urged by defendants.
[15] It remains only to consider the intervening plaintiff's
contention that the provision in the 1951 statute, "[ t] hat
all of the revenue heretofore derived, or to be derived, by
said city from 'dry gas,' obtained from said lands is hereby
declared to be free from the public trust . • . . " (italics
added], is an unconstitutional llttempt to validate the past
unlawful expenditure of such funds for general municipal
purposes. (Const., art. IV, § 25 [16'1. [18].) It was held in
Trickey v. City of Long Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871 [226
P.2d 694], that the income derived from the production of
"dry gas" from the tide and submerged lands granted to
the city was subject to the public trust for commerce, navigation, and fisheries, and that the expenditure of that income
for general municipal purposes was unlawful. It follows
from the conclusion reached above that as a result of the
1951 statute the city holds all of the funds" heretofore derived,
or to be derived" from the production of "dry gas" from

Apr. 1955]

MALLON 1J. CITY OF LONG BEACH

218

[44 C.2d 199: 282 P.2d 4811

the lands in question subject to a resulting trust in favor
of the state.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion, the revenue in question from oil and gas
production on tidelands, which lands had beell previously
granted by the stat.e to the city of Long Beach. have been
validly released by the Legislature from the trust, and the
city may properly use the revenue so released for municipal
improvements.
The precise question before us appears to be one of first
impression, but I do not believe that the conclusions reached
in the majority opinion can be reconciled with the decisions
of this court in Atwood v. Hammond, 4 Cal.2d 31 [48 P.2d
20], and Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609 [82
P.2d 362], nor with the implications of the more recent decision of this court in Oity of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Cal.2d
254 [188 P.2d 17]. These and other authorities wilJ be
hereinafter discussed, but as the solution of the present problem involves a determination of the respective rights of the
state and the city to the revenues which have been admittedly
released from the trust, the fundamental question to be considered is that of the nature of the trust under which the
tidelands are held. It appears to me that this question
has been erroneously oversimplified in the majority opinion,
which treats the state as the "trustor" or "settlor," and
the Act of 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2<143) as a "revocation,"
or at least a "partial revocation" of the trust, resulting in a
"reversion" to the state of said revenues. This reasoning is
based upon an assumed analogy in all respects between the
trust upon which the tidelands are held and the ordinary
private trust, but I can find no proper basis for such analogy.
On the contrary, the trust involved here appears to be sui
generis, and any attempt to determine the respective rights
of the state and city upon such reasoning can lead only to
confusion and to erroneous conclusions.
When the state embarked upon the program of granting
the tidelands to local authorities, it was dealing only with
those portions of land along the shore line which were submerged at high tide and exposerl at low tide. It is a matter
of common knowledge that there are little, if any, tidelands
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at many points where the shore line is precipitouS', and that
the greatest areas of tidelands are found in and about our
bays and at the mouths of our rivers, near which points many
of our municipalities have developed. In their natural state,
these tidelands were apparently of little value for any purpose, and were obviously of little value for navigation or
commerce because of the relatively shallow water which covered them even when the tides were at their highest. Furthermore, the extent of the so-called tidelands has been subject
to change over the years by reason of natural accretions to,
or the wearing away of, the shore line, or by reason of
artificial improvements. by way of dredging and filling. In
fact, the improvement of any tidelands for the purpose of
navigation and commerce normally contemplates the artificial change of a part or all of such land into high land
bordering upon water deep enough for the norma] purposes
of navigation and commerce. Hence, the state, in granting
the tidelands to the local authorities, was dealing with lands
having apparently little value and having irregular boundaries which could not be precisely and permanently delineated. The Legislature no doubt concluded that some of such
lands should be improved and could best be improved in
the interest of navigation and commerce by the local authorities which administered the lands bordering such tidelands.
It therefore embarked upon its program, and the grants to
the local authorities were accompanied with the express or
implied undertaking that such lands would be so improved
by the local authorities without expense to the state. Such
was the express stipulation in the grant of the tidelands
under consideration to the city of Long Beach. (City of
Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, 257.) Pursuant
to such undertaking, those lands have been extensively improved over the years by the city of Long Beach by the
expenditure of tremendous sums of money.
In the light of these observations, let us consider the nature
of the "trust" with which we are dealing. It has been said
that these tidelands were acquired by the State of California
by the act of admis.;;ion. subject however to a trust for
navigation, commerce and fisbing. (City 0/ Long Beach v_
JJ arsJtall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 614.) The precise nature of
this trust has never been clearly defined, and, as above
indicated, the trust appears to be ,<;11,1 generis. (See cases
discussed in Illinois Central R. Co. v. lllinois, 146 U.S. 387
[113 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018], and Boone v. Kingsbury, 206
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Cal. 148 [273 P. 797].) Some things nevertheless appear
certain. First, that the State of California was itself a trustee
rather than a trustor in relation to any trust imposed upon
such tidelands, and that the beneficiaries of such trust were
not alone the people of this state but all the people of the
United States. Thus, it has been indicated that the federal
government could enforce such trust. (Boone v. Kingsbury,
supra, 206 Cal. 148, 189.) Second, that the trust does not
permanently attach to all the lands which were originally
tidelands, for many of the areas embraced in the original
tideland areas have been improved by developing such lands
into high lands, and portions thereof have become either the
property of municipalities (Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4
Ca1.2d 31, 38) or of private owners (Boone v. Kingsbury,
supra, 206 Cal. 148, 189), free of any trust when no longer
necessary for the accomplishment of the trust purposes.
In determining the nature and extent of the trust imposed
upon the tidelands, such lands should be distinguished from
the lands involved in United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19 [67 8. Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889], which, under the complaint in that action, included only lands "lying seaward
of the ordinary low water mark on the coast of California."
(P. 22.) We are here concerned only with lands lying shoreward of such low water mark. While the trusts affecting both
types of land may have a common origin, no question was
raised in the cited case concerning the respective rights
of the state and the federal government in "tidelands down
to the low water mark." (P. 30.) Rather, the court merely
refused to extend the law relating to the latter, as expounded
in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U.S.) 212 [11 L.Ed.
565], to cover the land there in controversy to the seaward
of the low water mark.
The historical background of the trust in tidelands throws
some light upon the peculiar nature of such trust. The
original colonies acquired these tidelands by right of conquest, and after the conquest, such lands were held by them
"as they were by the king, in trust for the public uses of
navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves,
piers, light-houses, beacons and other facilities of navigation
and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were pubZiCJi
juris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people
at large. • . . It is also true that portions of the submerged
shoals and fiats, which really interfered with navigation,
and could better subserve the purposes of commerce by being
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filled up and reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for
that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of usele3s
parts affect the character of the title to the remainder."
(Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, supra, 146 U.S. 387, 457,
quoting from Stockton v. Baltimore &- N. Y. R. Co., 32 F.
9, 19, 20.)
With respect to the tidelands of California, it was said
that" upon the admission of California into the Union upon
equal footing with the original States, absolute property in,
and dominion and sovereignty over, all soils under the tide
waters within her limits passed to the State, with the consequent right to dispose of the title to any part of said soils
in such manner as she might deem proper, subject only to
the paramount right of navigation over the waters, as far as
Rueh navigation might be required by the necessities of commerce with foreign nations or among the several States, the
regulation of which was vested in the general government."
(Illinois Central R. Co. v. lllino·is, supra, 146 U.S. 387, 465,
quoting approvingly from Weber v. State Harbor Comrs.,
18 Wall. (U.S.) 57, 65 [21 L.Ed. 798].)
In Boone v. Kingsbury, supra, 206 Cal. 148, at page 180.
in referring to "the title in the soil of the sea or arms of
the sea," it is said that such title "at common law was
vested in thc sovereign in trust for the people"; and in
referring to the title of the states and to the exhaustive study
therein made of the entire subject, it quotes approvingly on
page 180 from Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 [14 8.Ct. 548,
38 L.Ed. 331], as follows: "The foregoing summary of
the laws of thc original states shows that there is no universal
and uniform law upon the subject; but that each state has
dealt with the lands under the tide waters within its borders
according to its own views of justice and policy . . • . "
In summary, it appears from these authorities that historically the title to the tidelands has been held by the sovereign subject to a trust which is defined in general terms
as a trust for navigation, commerce and fishing; that the
exact nature of the trust has never been clearly defined;
that the main purpose of the trust is to maintain a shore
line which is generally free from any substantial interference
with the public enjoyment of navigation, commerce and
fishing; that the sovereign may deal with the tidelands in
almost any way so long as there is no substantial impairment
of the trust purpose; and that any substantial impairment
of the trust purpose in the tid(>lands within any state could
})e abated by the state or the federal government.
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Concerning the California tidelands, we find that title to
all of such lands, with the possible exception of title to those
lands covered by prior Mexican grants, was acquired by
the state by the act of admission following their acquisition
by the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
In dealing with those lands in the early case of Oakland v.
Oakland Water Front 00., 118 Cal. 160, at page 183 [50
P. 277], the court said: " . . . the several states hold and
own the lands covered by navigable waters within their
respective boundaries in their sovereign capacity, and primarily for the purpose of preserving and improving the
public rights of navigation and fishery. They have in them
a double right, a jus publicum and a jus pr'ivatum. The
former pertains to their political power·-their sovereign dominion, and cannot be irrevocably alienated or materially
impaired. The latter is proprietary and the subject of private
ownership, but it is alienable only in strict subordination to
the former."
The same distinction between the state's sovereign and
proprietary rights in tidelands was made in Santa Oruz v.
Southern Pac. 00., 163 Cal. 538, 544 [126 P. 362], and in
People v. Oalifornia Fish 00., 166 Cal. 576, 597 [138 P. 79].
In its sovereign capacity, the state held these lands subject
to a public trust for navigation, commerce and fishing; and
it could not completely divest itself of its responsibilities as
such trustee to the impairment of the public interest. (Boone
v. Kingbury, supra, 206 Cal. 148, 183, 189; Oity of Long
Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Cal.2d 609, 614.) However, in
its proprietary capacity and as the proprietary owner, the
state could grant the tidelands to a municipality subject to
this public trust. (Atwood v. Hammond, supm, 4 Cal.2d
31, 37; Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609,
614-615.) This distinction between the state's sovereign and
proprietary rights and duties in respect to the tidelands was
not cons~dered material for the purpose of the decision in
Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall, Sllpl'a (see pp. 614-615),
but as will- hereinafter appear, such distinction is important
in the determination of the question presented here,
Various legislative acts, other than the Act of 1951 (Stats.
1951, p. 2443), affecting the Long Beach tidelands have been
discussed in numerous cases. (Oity of Long Beach v. Lisenby,
175 Cal. 575 [166 P. 333] ; Oity of Long Beach v. Marshall,
supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609; Miller v. Stockburger, 12 Ca1.2d 440
[85 P.2d 132] ; Oity of Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Cal.
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2d 254.) Such discussion will not be repeated here except
insofar as it affects the particular problem before us.
In City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609,
at page 616, it was said: "It remains only to point out briefly
that the history of tideland grants in this state, and the
actions of the various legislatures and the courts in connection
therewith, show a general agreement that the tidelands were
conveyed to municipalities in fee, subject only to the public
trusts and the limitations and reservations specified in the
acts; and that until the discovery of these valuable oil rights
in the Southern California tidelands no serious doubt was
ever expressed as to the title of the municip~)ities."
The Marshall case was brought on the theory that "the
rights in oil and other minerals belonged to the state and
not to the city" (p. 612), and such theory was held untenable.
(See also Miller v. Stockburger, supra, 12 Cal.2d 440.) The
court there said at page 613, in speaking of this original grant
to the city of Long Beach in 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 1304):
"Giving this language its ordinary and reasonable meaning,
it would seem clear that the state intended to and did convey
whatever title or interest it had in these lands to the city,
in fee simple, subject to certain conditions and upon certain
trusts. " I t follows from the two cited cases that ever since
the original grant in 1911, the rights in the oil and other
minerals under the Long Beach tidelands and the proceeds
from the extraction thereof have belonged to the city, rather
than to the state, subject only to the trust under which the
city held such tidelands.
In City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, the
question of the right of the city to divert a portion of the
proceeds of the production of oil and gas to the city's general
"Public Improvement Fund" was before this court. That
case arose prior to the Act of 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2443)
and before there had bcen any express declaration by the
Legislature that such proceeds were no longer necessary for
the trust purpose. This court there said at pages 257 and
258 : "If the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas are
regarded as corpus (see Rest. Trusts, § 238; Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees, § § 789, 828), they must be used for the purposes set forth in the legislative grants in trust, for the city,
as trustee, clearly has no authority to appropriate th::! corpus
to its own uses contrary to the terms of the trust. If the
proceeds are regarded as ineome from trust property, the
truatee, in the absence of a legislative provision to the CO1&-
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frary, has no more right to them than it has to the corpus."
(Emphasis added.)
Since the decision in City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra.
there has been enacted such "legislative provision to the
contrary." In 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2443), the Legislature
released a portion of such proceeds from the trust, being the
precise portion which is in controversy here. By that act
the Legislature expressly found and determined that from
the revenue derived from oil production from the tidelands.
the city has constructed upon these lands various harbor
facilities" necessary or convenient for the promotion of commerce and navigation" at a cost of approximately $35,000.000;
that from the same source the city has now available and
unexpended approximately $75,000,000; that it will continue
to receive from the same source for many years to come
approximately $24,000,000 per annum; that in additioll, the
city obtains large quantities of "dry gas" derived from the
natural gas produced from said lands, which it sells; that
in view of the already large expenditures on these lands
for harbor improvements and the available and anticipated
sums, the expenditures of more than 50 per cent of the revenue
from the oil production for trust purposes would be "economically impracticable, unwise and unnecessary"; that "50%
of all revenue" from the oil produced on these tidelands
and "all of the revenue . . . derived from 'dry gas' . . . is
hereby declared to be free from the public trust for navigation,
commerce and fisheries, and from such uses, trusts, conditions
and restrictions as are imposed by any of said above-entitled
acts. " (Stats.] 951, pp. 2444-2445.)
It was clearly within the power of the Legislature to release
such portion of the city's income from the trust upon finding
that such portion was no longer required for the purposes
of the trust. (Atwood v. Ham rnon d, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31,
35-36, 39, 41-42; Illinois Central R. 00. v. Illinois, supra,
146 U.S. 387, 452-453.) In the Atwood case, the Legislature
had made a similar declaration with respect to a portion
of the San Diego tidelands, releasing them from the trust.
(Stats. 1929, ch. 642, p. 1058.) This court there said at pages
42 and 43: "We are of the view that it was competent for
the legislature upon finding that the eighteen-acre tract was
'not longer required for navigation, commerce or fisheries,'
to free it from the public easem~nt for those purposes." It
was further held thAt the IJegislature could net thereafter
deal witlt such land rlpon the thoory that the state owned
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the land so released from the trust. If then the Legislature
may validly release a port.i(Jl1 of the tidelands themselves from
the trust upon finding that ~uch lands are no longer required
for trust purposes, it follows that the Legislature may validly
release a portion of the proceeds of such tidelands. Such
was the necessary implication of this court in City of Long
Beach v. Morse, supra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, when it predicated
its decision there on the "absence of a legislative provision"
expressly finding that such proceeds were no longer required
for trust purposes and releasing them from the trust.
The power of the Legislature to make such declaration
under appropriate circumstances is derived from its sovereignty and the duty imposed upon it in accepting the tidelands under the act of admission, subject to the public trust.
It is true that this court, in discussing the possible distinction between the state's sovereign and proprietary rights in
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, said
at page 614: "There is neither logic in, nor practical necessity for the 'double fee' doctrine"; and on page 615 said,
in speaking of the grant to the city: Such language cannot
be distorted to mean that the grant to the city is only of rights
of sovereignty in the sense of political or governmental
power. The argument of the state's 'double fee' is met by
the very statutory language which grants the land, for it
conveys' all' the' right, title and interest' of the state. Whatever the state had by way of title or interest, however, divided
it may have been, it all passed under the plain words of the
grant. " That language should be read in the light of the
problem then before the court, and it should not be interpreted so broadly as to declare that the state, acting in its
sovereign capacity, did not retain the power and duty to
determine when any portion of the tidelands might be declared no longer nccessary for trust purposes, and therefore
be released from the trust. That the state in its sovereign
capacity retained such power and duty is clearly indicated in
several cases. (Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 184, 191
[273 P. 797] ; Atwood v. Hammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, 3843; City of N ewpo-rt Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal.App.2d 23, 2~
[102 P.2d 438] ; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois. supra, 146
U.S. 387, 453-455), and is clearly implied in City of Long
Beach v. Morse, S1tpra, 31 Ca1.2d 254, which was based upon
the" absence of a legislative provision" finding that the proceeds were no longer required for trust purposes. As was
said iA City oj Newpo-rt Beach v. Fager, supra, at page 29:
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". • . by virtue of the prior grants to the city, the state
has divested itself of all interest in such land excepting its
interest as the sovereign in protecting the public tr·ust."
(Emphasis added.) In other words, the only right reserved
by the state with respect to the tidelands or their proceeds
was its sovereign right to protect the trust and to declare
when, if ever, any portion of such lands or their proceeds
might no longer be required for the trust purposes and might
be released from the trust without any substantial impairment of the trust purposes. In the present case the Legislature has exercised that right and has released the disputed
proceeds by the 1951 enactment. (Stats. 1951, p. 2443.)
The majority opinion declares that the solution of the
present problem depends upon "the validity and effect of
the 1951 statute revoking in part the public trust on the
income derived from the lands in question. Thus, the principal issues to be resolved in the present case are whether
the revocation was a valid exercise of the legislative power,
whether the revocation operated as a transfer from the state
to the city of the monies affected thereby, and, if so, whether
such a transfer would offend the constitutional prohibition
against gifts of public moneys." (Emphasis added.)
Thus the entire majority opinion is based upon the theory
that the Act of 1951 was a partial "revocation" of a trust
created by the state and a "transfer from the state to the
city of the monies affected thereby." I agree that the solution of the problem depends upon the validity and effect of
the 1951 statute, but I cannot agree with the reasoning of
the majority opinion. It treats the state as the "trustor" or
"settlor," with the property reverting "to the settlor" upon
the termination of the trust; whereas, as heretofore indicated,
the state was itself only a trustee with respect to the public
trust under which the tidelands were previously held by it,
and it had previously conveyed all its proprietary interest
to the city. This court has clearly declared that the title to
the tidelands, and therefore to the proceeds thereof, was
thereafter in the city, not the state, subject only to the trust,
for "whatever the state had by way of title or interest, . . .
it all passed under the plain words of the grant" to the city
of Long Beach; and that such conveyance carried with it
"the mineral rights in the land." (City of Long Beach v.
Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609, 615, 616.)
It follows that the Act of 1951 was not a "reyocation"
of any trust in any true sense of the word. The state was
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not the trustor or settlor to which the lands or their proceeds
would revert upon the termination of the trust. It is true
that the state's grant to the city employed the words "in
trust for the uses and purposes and upon the express conditions following . . . " (City of Long Beach v. Morse, supra,
31 Ca1.2d 254, 256) ; but the grant did not create the trust.
which already existed and under which the state itself held
the property as trustee, and said grant merely imposed such
conditions as the state deemed necessary to protect such preexisting public trust. Following the grant to the city the
tidelands and the procceds therefrom belonged to the city
of Long Beach, subject only to the trust, and hence the
exercise of the sovereign power by the state in 1951, in
declaring a portion of the proceeds released from the trust,
did not in any sense effect a "transfer" of anything "from
the state to the city." It therefore appears that the claim
that the Act of 1951 was invalid under section 31 of the
Constitution cannot be sustained. The majority opinion concedes that the original grants of the tidelands to the cities
"do not violate the constitutional prohibition against gifts,"
and it follows that the exercise by the state of its power to
release a part of the tidelands or the proceeds from the trust
is merely an exercise of the limited power retained by the
state in its sovereign capacity following the original grant
of all its right, title and interest in said tidelands. The validity of such a release was sustained in Atwood v. Hammond,
supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31.
It may be conceded that the majority opinion, by starting
from an erroneous premise, reads quite plausibly. The
erroneous premise, however, appears to be unfortunate, for
the premise itself docs violence to the principles laid down
in the authorities, and more particularly to those clearly
cnunciated in Atwood v. Jl ammond, supra, 4 Ca1.2d 31, and
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, supra, 11 Ca1.2d 609. Furthermore, thc conclusions reached run contrary to the principles laid down in those cases and the other authorities
above cited. These authorities sustain the judgment of the
trial court.
It may well be that the state, as a matter of policy, should
have reserved to itself the mineral rights in the Long Beach
tidelands. It has made snch reservation in later grants to
other cities and counties, such as Santa Barbara (Stats. 1931,
p. 1742), Ventura (Stats. 1935, p. 869), and Santa Cruz (Stats.
1935, p. 1876). The fact remains, however, that the state did
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not make any similar reservation in the grant to the city of
Long Beach, and I find no justification for now declaring,
contrary to the principles enunciated in the prior decisions
of this court, that the state has any right, title or interest
therein or to the proceeds therefrom.
In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.
Schauer, J., concurred.
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SHENK, J.-J concur in the dissenting oplDlon of Mr.
Justice Spence and deem it unanswerable. A further word
seems desirable from my standpoint.
When Boone v. Kingsbury was decided by this court in
1928 [206 Cal. 148 (273 P. 797)] ::: expressed the view as
the sole dissenter that permits proposed to be issued by the
state for exploration and production of oil and gas from tidelands of the state would be inconsistent with the trust under
which the state held those lands, namely, for commerce, navigation and fisheries. That case involved tidelands of the
state outside of any municipality. It was there decided by
the majority that the state owns those lands in fee subject
only to the limited trust and that the granting of permits
there sought to be issued by the state on a royalty basis
for the production of oil and gas would not be inconsistent
with the trust. The holding in that case has been the law
of the state without deviation since that time. It has also
been the law of the state that in granting to municipalities
the tidelands within their borders the state conveyed the fee
subject only to the same trust under which the state owned
them. If leasing directly by the state for oil and gas production is not inconsistent with the trust the same rule should
apply to a municipality occupying the same position as its
grantor, the state. The case of City of Long Beach v. Morse,
31 Ca1.2d 254 [188 P.2d 17], specifically left the way open
for further legislation on the subject. That legislation was
supplied by the Act of 1951 (Stats. 1951, p. 2443). By that
enactment there is a legislative finding that the use of the
proceeds from oil and gas. production by the city of Long
Beach is not in any way affected by the terms of the trust.
If the city of Long Beach is bound by the terms of the trust,
as the majority holds, the state likewise is bound by the
same trust. The only logical deduction to be drawn from
the majority opinion is that the trust relationship now de-
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clared is also fastened on the state's title and right to the
use of the proceeds from oil and gas development and production on tidelands.
Following the case of United States v. California in 1947
(332 U.S. 19 [67 8.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889]) the United
States granted to the several states bordering tidelands and
to their grantees the right,· title and interest of the federal
government in and to such tidelands (Public Law No. 31,
67 Stats. p. 29, approved May 22, 1953). By that enactment
the government reserved from the grant the right to exercise
its constitutional powers over commerce and navigation and
partieularly stated in section 6 of the act that the reservation
should "not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of
ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources
which are specially recognized, confirmed, established, and
vested in and assigned to the respective States and others
by section 3 of this Act." If the title of the city of Long
Beach is encumbered by the trust, as the majority holds, the
title of the State of California is also subject to the trust,
and falls within the reservations of the act of Congress.
The only way to avoid this conclusion is to declare, as we
should, that the proceeds from oil and gas development here
involved fall within the proprietary classification of the
property of the city of Long Beach in accordance with the
statutory and decisional law of the state and as contemplated
by the recent act of Congress.
The petition of Respondent City of Long Beach for a rehearing was denied May 4, 1955. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.
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